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abstract
The aim of this study was to explain why children have difficulty with
homonymy. Two experiments were conducted with forty-eight children
(Experiment 1) and twenty-four children (Experiment 2). Three- and
four-year-old children had to either select or judge another person’s
selection of a different object with the same name, avoiding identical
objects and misnomers. Older children were successful, but despite
possessing the necessary vocabulary, younger children failed these tasks.
Understanding of homonymy was strongly and significantly associated
to understanding of synonymy, and more importantly, understanding of
false belief, even when verbal mental age, chronological age, and control
measures were partialled out. This indicates that children’s ability to
understand homonymy results from their ability to make a distinction
characteristic of representation, a distinction fundamental to both
metalinguistic awareness and theory of mind.
introduction
Homonyms are words with two distinct, unrelated meanings such as bat
(flying mammal) and bat (sports equipment). Preschool children have
difficulties correctly interpreting homonyms: they tend to interpret
homonyms as the most common meaning even when contextual information
indicates this is absurd (Campbell & Macdonald, 1982 ; Beveridge & Marsh,
1991). Even older children appear to have difficulties learning homonyms
(Mazzocco, 1997).
Understanding homonymy is clearly metalinguistic : it requires children to
distinguish between the linguistic medium and what it represents. It also
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requires children to understand at least one aspect of the relationship
between the two: that one linguistic form can be used to represent more than
one kind of object. Children’s difficulties with homonymy could result from
their metalinguistic awareness, or lack of it, in two possible ways:
(1) The metalinguistic deficit account: children may lack the ability to
conceive of the relationship between linguistic form and meaning. As a
result, they would not search for a secondary meaning when their initial
interpretation was absurd.
(2) The metalinguistic one-to-one mapping account: children may be able
to conceive of the relationship between linguistic form and meaning, but hold
an erroneous assumption about the nature of this relationship. In relation to
children’s understanding of homonymy, it has been proposed that children
assume each meaning is expressed by a distinct form (Slobin, 1985). This
one-to-one mapping assumption might be useful in learning language, since
it constrains the number of hypotheses children need to consider when trying
to learn the meanings of words.
However, the one-to-one mapping account has not been spelled out in
detail, and it may not require metalinguistic awareness. Thus there is a third,
non-metalinguistic reason for children’s difficulties with homonyms:
(3) The implicit one-to-one mapping account: rather than an explicit
assumption that one form has just one meaning, the one-to-one mapping
assumption may be better characterized as an implicit tendency not to assign
the same form to different meanings. This would imply that children simply
do not learn homonyms.
Either of the metalinguistic accounts would also predict learning
homonyms would be difficult. Whichever of the three accounts is true, it is
conceivable that young children learn some homonyms. Under either
metalinguistic account, children might learn homonyms because they fail to
notice they already know a different meaning for that particular linguistic
form. For the metalinguistic one-to-one mapping account, children might
relax their assumption for individual words given strong evidence that the
word does in fact violate the one-to-one mapping assumption. Some
homonyms might also be learned because children did not notice that they
already knew a different meaning for a novel word. For the implicit one-to-
one mapping account, given repeated exposure to the secondary meaning of
a homonym children might eventually learn two distinct meanings for the
word. However, for the implicit one-to-one mapping account, once they had
learned both words, children would not be able to access both words on
demand without the addition of metalinguistic awareness.
Clearly these differing explanations will be hard to tease apart. Studies to
date have failed to do this. Peters & Zaidel (1980) and Backscheider &
Gelman (1995) found that by at least the age of four years children possessed
the metalinguistic ability to identify homonym pairs. In both studies children
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were shown four pictures, two of which were homonymous. Children were
required to identify them, and thus acknowledge that different kinds of object
can share the same name. Peters & Zaidel used a graded series of prompts
from ‘find another picture that sounds exactly the same as this one but means
a different kind of thing’ to ‘find another kind of [e.g.] bat’. They found that
children of mean age 3 ;10 made just under 50% correct responses on this
task, whereas children of mean age 4 ;9 gave 84% correct responses.
Backscheider & Gelman, using the same task but omitting all but the final
most explicit prompt, found that children of mean age 3 ;9 were about 75%
correct on this task. They did not include younger or older children, so the
development of this ability is difficult to judge.
This task seems to require children to understand the relationship between
words and their referents, and thus to require metalinguistic awareness.
However, it also requires children to possess the relevant vocabulary.
Backscheider & Gelman (1995) found that on average 82% of homonym
pairs were in children’s vocabularies. Although this is similar to the 75%
success rate on the experimental task, direct comparison is not possible
because different children took the vocabulary and experimental tasks. Peters
& Zaidel (1980) did not report the level of vocabulary performance, but
found very high correlations between vocabulary performance and success on
the Homonym task. Thus it is possible that younger children in these studies
had the necessary metalinguistic awareness but lacked the vocabulary to
demonstrate it.
To begin to resolve why children should experience difficulties with
homonyms it is necessary to distinguish between vocabulary difficulties and
metalinguistic difficulties. Evidence of relevant metalinguistic abilities in
preschoolers has been provided by Doherty & Perner (1998). They examined
children’s understanding of synonymy, which like homonymy requires
children to understand the relationship between linguistic form and meaning:
for synonymy, one referent has two names, and for homonymy, one name has
two referents. They found that the ability to produce one half of a synonym
pair when given the other (Experiments 3 & 4), or to judge others’ attempts
to produce synonyms (Experiments 1 & 2) develop around the age of four
years. Younger children were unable to do this, even though they possessed
the necessary vocabulary and were able to pass control tasks of equivalent
logical structure and complexity.
These difficulties with synonymy would be predicted by either the
metalinguistic deficit account or the metalinguistic one-to-one mapping
account. Children’s error patterns favoured the metalinguistic deficit ac-
count, but the strongest evidence came from children’s performance on the
False Belief task. Children’s ability to predict another person’s mistaken
belief correlated very highly with their performance on the Synonym task,
with correlations remaining between rfl0–60 (Experiment 4) and rfl0–85
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(Experiment 1) even after control measures and verbal intelligence were
partialled out.
Doherty & Perner (1998) argue that understanding of synonymy and of
false belief are strongly associated because both metalinguistic awareness and
understanding of false belief rest on a common insight that things can be
represented in a certain way (Perner, 1991, 1995). In the typical False Belief
task, the protagonist places an object in one location which is moved in his
absence. The protagonist has a mental state which represents something (the
real location) in a certain way (in this case, in a way that differs from reality).
Similarly language represents states of affairs in a certain way (e.g. in terms
of its formal structure). In the case of synonyms, the same state of affairs can
be represented in terms of different formal structures. Since homonymy is
very similar to synonymy, the argument can be extended to the case of
homonyms. The metalinguistic ability to understand homonymy should
develop at the same time as the abilities to understand synonymy and false
belief, i.e. at roughly the same time that children pass the Homonym task
devised by Peters & Zaidel (1980). The aim of the present study is to test this
prediction. This was in order to distinguish between the metalinguistic
deficit account and both of the one-to-one mapping accounts of children’s
homonym difficulties, and to further test Doherty & Perner’s hypothesis that
children succeed on the False Belief task because they can distinguish
between what is represented and how it is represented. This was done in the
following way:
(1) The Homonym task used in previous studies was improved by
ensuring that failure does not result from lack of the necessary vocabulary.
(2) The Homonym task was administered together with a suitable Syn-
onym task and the False Belief task. If children’s difficulty with homonyms
is metalinguistic in nature, these three tasks should be strongly associated.
(3) To avoid failure due to misunderstanding of instructions or task
demands, an extensive modelling phase was included in which the ex-
perimenter provides the answers for the child if necessary, along with
feedback and explanations.
(4) Peters & Zaidel (1980) and Backscheider & Gelman (1995) both
suggest deficits in children’s search skills as potential reasons for failure on
the Homonym task. To minimize the need for these skills, instead of
requiring children to identify homonyms themselves, this was ‘attempted’
by a puppet. Children had to judge whether Puppet was successful or not.
(5) As a further guarantee against failure due to general task demands an
analogous control task was introduced. Instead of having to select a
homonym, Puppet’s job was to point to another picture of the same kind of
object.
(6) Since performances on the Homonym, Synonym and False Belief tasks
might be related simply due to a common association with verbal mental age,
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a measure of verbal mental age was taken using the British Picture
Vocabulary Scale, the British version of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary
Scale (Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Pintillie, 1982).
The modified Homonym task is analogous to the Synonym Judgement
task used by Doherty & Perner (1998, Experiments 1 & 2) and follows the
same logic. Children are shown sets of pictures which include a homonym
pair, for example, bat (animal) and bat (sporting equipment). Children are
asked to indicate one bat and then have to judge whether a puppet
successfully indicates the other bat. In three types of trial the puppet
indicates the same object as the child, an irrelevant object, or the homonym.
In order to successfully judge the puppet’s performance on every trial
children must monitor meaning, to check that the puppet indicates a
different kind of object, and verbal form, to check that the puppet indicates
an object with the same name. If children monitored the difference in
meaning alone they would judge incorrectly on the trial in which the puppet
indicates an irrelevant object; if they monitored the sameness of verbal form,
they would fail the trial in which the puppet indicates the same object as the
child. Thus the appropriate criterion for success on the Homonym task – and
the analogous Synonym and Object Pointing control tasks – is success on all
3 types of trial.
EXPERIMENT 1
method
Participants
The participants were 48 children (20 boys and 28 girls) from a University
preschool in Stirling, Scotland. Ages ranged from 2 ;11 to 4 ;7, with a mean
age of 3 ;5 and a standard deviation of 4–5 months. For the analysis of results
children were divided into two groups: a younger group (24 children from
2 ;11 to 3 ;4, mean age 3 ;1, s.d.fl1–5 months) and an older group (24
children from 3 ;4 to 4 ;7, mean age 3 ;8, s.d.fl3–5 months).
Design
Each child was tested on all four tasks: Homonym Judgement, Synonym
Judgement, False Belief, and Object Pointing control. Tasks were ad-
ministered over two sessions about a week apart with two tasks per session.
The order of administration was counterbalanced in a 4‹4 sequence
balanced Latin square design. In addition the British Picture Vocabulary
Scale (BPVS) long form was administered about a week after the second
session.
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Procedure and materials
Each child was seen in a quiet and familiar room adjacent to the nursery area.
The following four tasks were administered in the order discussed in the
Design section above.
Homonym Judgement task
The Homonym Judgement task comprised three phases: vocabulary check,
modelling, and test phase.
Vocabulary check. In this phase children were given a vocabulary test
checking on their knowledge of the homonyms used later in the modelling
and test phases. It also served to alert the child to the distinctions which had
to be made in the experiment. Seven A4 sheets were used, each with four
pictures on: both members of a homonym pair and two distracters. See Table
1 for a list of the homonyms used.
table 1 . Experimental items and percentage of children who identified both
items from homonym or synonym pairs
Homonym 1}2 %known Synonym pairs %known
Modelling Letter
(grapheme}envelope)
92 Rabbit}Bunny
Nail (iron}finger) 96 Cup}Mug
Test 1 Bat (sports}flying) 88 Lady}Woman 92
2 Glasses
(drinking}specs.)
98 Truck}Lorry 98
3 Knight}Night 73 TV}Television 96
Replacements 4 Bare}Bear 91 Jacket}Coat 96
5 Bow (ribbon}weapon) 100
Children were shown each sheet with the homonym judged to be most
familiar to the child covered by a white piece of card. The first sheet had a
picture of a fish, a bicycle, a letter (the letter A), and a letter (a stamped
addressed envelope). The envelope was covered, children were shown the
picture and asked ‘Can you point to letter?’. (Although ‘a letter’ would have
been more natural, the indefinite article would have been less appropriate for
some of the other items, such as night, glasses, and particularly bare, so it was
excluded.) After the child responded, the card was moved to cover the other
homonym, the letter A, and the child was asked ‘Which one of these is
letter?’. If children pointed to the card now covering their original choice the
visible three pictures were indicated and they were asked ‘Which one of
these three is letter?’. When children had identified the second homonym,
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the first was uncovered and the experimenter said, ‘So this is letter, and this
is letter. They’ve got the same name!’. The procedure was repeated with the
next four sheets. On the third and fourth sheets, after the first homonym had
been identified and covered, children were asked to identify one of the
distracter items. This was to prevent them thinking that for the second
question they should always point to the object that had just been uncovered.
Any vocabulary failures were noted and these items were replaced in the
modelling and test phases by the replacement items (see Table 1). To
continue to the test phase children had to know at least 5 out of the 7
homonym pairs. Only one child (3 ;5) did not, and was replaced.
Modelling phase.The objective of this phase was to model the actual test
procedure. A teddy bear glove puppet was used. The child was shown the
first of the A4 sheets used in the vocabulary check and invited to point to a
‘ letter’ (grapheme or envelope). Puppet’s job was to point to ‘the other letter,
not the same one you pointed to’. Puppet made two incorrect attempts,
pointing first to the same letter as the child and then to an unrelated object
(a bicycle). Finally Puppet correctly pointed to the other letter. Each attempt
was followed by the test question: ‘Is that what he should have done?’. After
a short pause the experimenter provided the answer, repeating that Puppet’s
job was to point to a letter, but not the same one as the child. The procedure
was repeated for the other warm-up item, nail (fingernail or iron nail).
Test phase. For the test phase the modelling phase was continued with 3
new picture sheets and no feedback. Puppet made only one attempt to
identify the homonym per sheet and then the test question : ‘Is that what he
should have done?’ was asked. The sheets containing homonym pictures
were always presented in a fixed order, as listed in Table 1 (items children
failed to identify in the vocabulary check were replaced from replacement
items 4 and 5).
For the Homonym task, and the Synonym and Object Pointing tasks, there
were three trial types: in one trial Puppet incorrectly gave the same response
as the child. In one trial Puppet pointed to a distracter (Homonym and
Object Pointing tasks) or misnamed the object (Synonym task). In one trial
Puppet correctly pointed to a different picture with the same name (Hom-
onym), pointed to a different picture of the same object (Object Pointing), or
gave a synonym (Synonym). Assignment of the three trial types to the three
picture sheets was counterbalanced between participants in a 3‹3 sequence
balanced Latin square design. For individual participants, trials were
presented in a different order for each of the three tasks. To pass the
Homonym, Synonym, or Object Pointing tasks, children had to answer
correctly on each of the three trials, as discussed in the Introduction.
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Object Pointing control
The procedure in this task was designed to parallel the modelling and test
phases of the Homonym Judgement task.
Children were shown an A4 sheet with four drawings on. Two of the
drawings were the same (of the same objects used in the Synonym Judgement
task, below) and two were different, e.g. two rabbits, a tree and a house. The
child was asked to point to one of the identical pictures (in this case, a rabbit)
and Puppet’s job was ‘to point to the other rabbit, NOT the one [the child]
pointed to’. Children were required to judge whether Puppet’s response was
appropriate. The test question was: ‘Is that what he should have done?’.
There were two trials of this procedure in the modelling phase, each with
a different sheet of pictures. As in the homonym modelling phase, Puppet
pointed to the same object as the child and then an unrelated object before
pointing correctly, with the experimenter providing appropriate feedback
and explanation. For the test phase the procedure continued without
feedback, Puppet only making one response per sheet. The sheets were
always presented in a fixed order, and the three trial types were counter-
balanced as discussed above.
Synonym Judgement task
The Synonym Judgement task also designed to be as far as possible
analogous to the Homonym Judgement task. It consisted of three phases:
vocabulary-check, modelling and test phase.
Vocabulary check. In this phase children were given a vocabulary test
checking on their knowledge of the synonyms used later in the actual test. It
also served to alert the child to the distinctions which had to be made in the
experiment. Four A4 sheets were used. Each of them had four pictures on it.
Two of the pictures were experimental items used later (truck}lorry and
woman}lady on two of the sheets; TV}television and coat}jacket on the other
two). The other two items on each sheet were chosen from among a rabbit,
a cat, an apple, a bird, and a daisy. Children were shown each sheet and asked
to point to, e.g. a truck, and then to a lorry. If they hesitated they were given
encouragement, and the question was repeated if they answered incorrectly.
They were then told that the object has two names, lorry and truck. On the
third and fourth sheets the first item to identify was not one of the
experimental items, in order to prevent children from thinking that the same
item was required for both questions on each sheet, and then pointing to the
same item regardless of which word is used. Then the experimental item was
asked about once with each synonym, as before.
Modelling phase. The objective of this part of the procedure was to model
the actual test procedure. A white glove puppet and a hand drawn 10‹15 cm
colour picture showing a rabbit were used. The child was shown the picture
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of a rabbit, told that it could be called a rabbit or a bunny, and invited to
choose one of these names. The puppet’s task was ‘to say the other name.
NOT the one that you said’. Puppet made two incorrect attempts, first using
the same name as the child and then saying something unrelated (e.g.
elephant or banana). Finally Puppet correctly gave the synonym. Each
attempt was followed by the test question: ‘Is that what he should have
said?’. After a short pause the experimenter provided the answer, reminding
the child that Puppet’s job was to produce a correct name, but not the same
one as the child. The procedure was repeated for the other warm-up item,
cup}mug.
Test phase. For the actual test the modelling phase was continued with four
new pictures but no feedback was given. Puppet named each item only once
and then the test question: ‘Is that what he should have said?’ was asked.
The three items were always presented in fixed order as listed in Table 1, but
the assignment of response-type was counterbalanced as discussed above.
Depending on response-type (same, synonym, different-meaning) the puppet
used one of the following words for each of the following three items (plus
replacement):
1. woman: ‘woman’, ‘ lady’, ‘ truck’.
2. truck: ‘ truck’, ‘ lorry’, ‘ lady’.
3. television: ‘television’, ‘TV.’, ‘coat’.
(4. coat: ‘coat’, ‘ jacket ’, ‘ television’.)
False Belief test
For this test a short story was acted out with two Playpeople dolls (5 cm), a
marble, an opaque jar (5 cm high‹2–5 cm wide) and a box (3 cm high‹4 cm
wide). In the story one of the dolls, Sally, places a marble in the box and exits.
In her absence the other doll moves the marble to the jar and also leaves.
Sally returns and children are asked the following questions:
Belief question: Where will she look first for her marble?
Reality question: Where is the marble really?
Memory question: Where did Sally put the marble in the beginning?
British Picture Vocabulary Scale
The long form of the BPVS was administered about a week after the original
test sessions.
results
All p-values are 2-tailed, except Fisher’s exact p-values, which are 1-tailed.
Correlations are Pearson product-moment correlations (r). Special cases of
Pearson’s r are used when one variable is dichotomous (point biserial
coefficient, r
pb
) or both variables are dichotomous (phi coefficient, ru).
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Fig. 1. Number of children showing understanding of Homonymy, Synonymy and False
Belief in Experiment 1.
Vocabulary checks
Table 1 shows the performance on the homonym and synonym vocabulary
checks. Twenty-six out of the 48 children knew all 5 pairs of homonyms, and
with the inclusion of replacement items all but one child knew at least 5
homonym pairs. This child was replaced as noted in the Method. All the
children knew at least 3 synonym pairs. Thus for the Synonym and
Homonym tasks, all test pairs were demonstrably in children’s vocabularies.
False Belief control questions
Two children failed the memory question on the False Belief task, and failed
the belief question. Two children failed the reality question, and passed the
false belief question. All four children were included in the analysis.
Performance and comparison of experimental tasks
Figure 1 shows the number of children in the two age groups passing the four
tasks: Homonym, Synonym, False Belief and Object Pointing. Clearly,
performance on the Object Pointing control is very good for both age groups.
The difference between the two groups’ performances is marginally sig-
nificant, Fisher’s exact, pfl0–055. For the Homonym, Synonym, and False
Belief tasks the age differences are more pronounced and significant:
Homonym task, Fisher’s exact, pfl0–03 ; Synonym task, Fisher’s exact,
pfl0–006, False Belief task, Fisher’s exact, pfl0–004.
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table 2 . (a) Ranges, means, standard deviations and intercorrelations between
variables of Experiment . (b) Correlations between Homonym, Synonym, and
False Belief tasks, partialling out verbal mental age (BPVS) and age
(a)
Variable Range Mean s.d.
Age 2 ;11–4 ;7 3 ;5 4–5 m.
BPVS 1 ;8–6 ;5 3 ;9 12–5 m.
Homonym 0–1 0–69 0–47
Synonym 0–1 0–56 0–50
Object Pointing 0–1 0–92 0–28
False Belief 0–1 0–54 0–50
Synonym
False
Belief
Object
Pointing BPVS AGE
Homonym 0–67*** 0–55*** 0–28 0–42** 0–33*
Synonym — 0–71*** 0–34* 0–59*** 0–42**
False Belief — 0–33* 0–60*** 0–48***
Object Pointing — 0–32* 0–28
BPVS — 0–27
(b)
Synonym
False
Belief
Homonym 0–48*** 0–35**
Synonym — 0–54***
*p!0–05 ; **p!0–01 ; ***p!0–001.
However, even for the younger group, performances on the language tasks
were above the level expected if children were simply guessing (pfl0–125) :
Homonym task, Binomial, Nfl24, kfl13, p!0–001 ; Synonym task, Bi-
nomial, nfl24, kfl9, p!0–001. It is inappropriate to compare performance
on the false belief task to chance because children without false belief
understanding typically make the systematic error of looking in the object’s
actual location (for an illustration of the probability of passing the false belief
task at different mental and chronological ages, see Happe! , 1995).
Table 2 gives further details of the experimental variables, and the
correlations between them. Correlations between the Homonym, Synonym,
and False Belief tasks are substantial and highly significant. However,
performance on each of these tasks is also significantly related to both age and
BPVS score. Thus the relationship between them might be attributable to a
common relationship with verbal mental age and other more general age
related abilities. Table 2 (b) shows that after age and BPVS score have been
partialled out, the Homonym, Synonym and False Belief tasks remain
significantly correlated. The near ceiling performance on the object pointing
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task means that the correlations between it and the other experimental
variables were low.
Despite the relationship between the tasks, from Figure 1 it appears that
for the younger group performance on the Homonym task is superior to
performance on the other two experimental tasks. In order to investigate this
possible difference between the Homonym task on the one hand, and the
Synonym and False Belief tasks on the other, the following analysis looks at
the relationship between the three tasks within each age group. Table 3 gives
details of the experimental variables and intercorrelations for the older 24
children. All three tasks are strongly correlated; after age and BPVS score are
partialled out, the Synonym–False Belief correlation just falls short of
conventional significance (p!0–07), but the correlation between the Syn-
onym and Homonym tasks remains remarkably high, and the correlation
between the Homonym task and the False Belief task is substantial and
significant.
The younger group shows quite a different pattern, as shown in Table 4.
The Homonym task is significantly correlated to the Synonym and False
Belief tasks, although less strongly than for the older children. However,
table 3 . (a) Ranges, means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations
between variables of Experiment : older age group. (b) Correlations between
Homonym, Synonym, and False Belief tasks, partialling out verbal mental age
(BPVS) and age
(a)
Variable Range Mean s.d.
Age 3 ;4–4 ;7 3 ;8 3–5 m.
BPVS 2 ;5–6 ;5 4 ;1 12 m.
Homonym 0–1 0–83 0–38
Synonym 0–1 0–75 0–44
Object Pointing 0–1 1–00 0–00
False Belief 0–1 0–75 0–44
Synonym
False
Belief BPVS AGE
Homonym 0–78*** 0–52** 0–20 0–19
Synonym — 0–56** 0–49* 0–23
False Belief — 0–46* 0–34
BPVS — 0–14
(b)
Synonym
False
Belief
Homonym 0–79*** 0–47*
Synonym — 0–40
*p!0–05 ; **p!0–01 ; ***p!0–001.
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table 4 . (a) Ranges, means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations
between variables of Experiment : younger age group. (b) Correlations between
Homonym, Synonym, and False Belief tasks, partialling out verbal mental age
(BPVS) and age
(a)
Variable Range Mean s.d.
Age 2 ;11–3 ;4 3 ;1 1–5 m.
BPVS 1 ;8–6 ;5 3 ;5 12 m.
Homonym 0–1 0–54 0–51
Synonym 0–1 0–38 0–49
Object Pointing 0–1 0–83 0–38
False Belief 0–1 0–33 0–48
Synonym
False
Belief
Object
Pointing BPVS AGE
Homonym 0–54** 0–47* 0–26 0–49* 0–08
Synonym — 0–73*** 0–35 0–59** 0–21
False Belief — 0–32 0–62*** 0–16
Object Pointing — 0–36 0–16
BPVS — fi0–19
(b)
Synonym
False
Belief
Homonym 0–30 0–19
Synonym — 0–50**
*p!0–05 ; **p!0–01 ; ***p!0–001
once age and BPVS scores are partialled out, the correlations become small
and non-significant. By contrast, the correlation between the Synonym and
False Belief tasks remains substantial and significant. The mean level of
performance on the Synonym and False Belief tasks is roughly comparable
for each age group. While performance on the Homonym task is superior for
both groups, this is particularly marked for the younger children
discussion
The results appear to show that understanding of homonymy is just
developing between the ages of three and four years. Unlike previous studies,
failure on the Homonym task cannot be attributed to the absence of
homonyms from children’s vocabularies, since all children correctly iden-
tified both items from the homonym test pairs in the vocabulary check. The
excellent performance on the Object Pointing control task indicates that
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failure is not attributable to a lack of search skills or any more general
difficulties with the format or understanding of task demands.
Furthermore, the Homonym task was associated strongly and significantly
with both the Synonym task and the False Belief tasks. These tasks also
associated strongly with each other, replicating the findings of Doherty &
Perner (1998 ; Experiments 1 & 2). This suggests common factors underlie
these tasks over and above any common association with chronological age
and verbal mental age. However, this conclusion is weakened by the fact that
for the youngest group, once chronological and verbal mental age are
partialled out, there was no longer any specific relationship between the
Homonym task and either the Synonym or the False Belief task.
One possible explanation for this difference between the age groups is that
the Homonym Judgement task, along with the tasks used by Peters & Zaidel
(1980) and Backscheider & Gelman (1995), is prone to false positives. The
task was designed to measure the ability to compare a difference in the object
with sameness of word. This would require children to conceive of the
relationship between linguistic form and what it represents. However, the
way the task is implemented means that difference of object also always
corresponds to difference of location. Children could therefore succeed on
this task by comparing a difference in location with sameness in word: they
could realize that it was incorrect for Puppet to choose the same location as
they did (or precisely the same object). When Puppet chooses an object in a
different location, children could give the correct reply by simply asking
themselves (e.g.) ‘ is this a bat?’. This non-metalinguistic strategy would not
be available for the Synonym task.
A few children employing this strategy could account for the difference
between the experimental tasks of Experiment 1. The older children were
generally successful at all tasks, so the possibility of false positives would
have little effect on their overall results. However, the effect of false positives
on the younger group’s performance on the Homonym task would have been
more marked. Furthermore, the children able to devise this alternative
strategy during the modelling phase, would tend to be more intelligent. This
would explain why partialling out BPVS scores, as well as age, caused the
correlations with the Synonym and False Belief tasks to dwindle to non-
significance. The aim of Experiment 2 is to confirm the overall findings of
Experiment 1 by eliminating the possibility of false positives. In Experiment
2, the initial exemplar of a homonym is no longer one of the response options.
EXPERIMENT 2
The judgement task used in Experiment 1 is quite conservative: children
only succeed if they produce a series of correct responses, so brief lapses in
attention can result in failure, and the task is unlikely to show transitional
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performance. The following experiment allowed a range of performance by
using a selection procedure based on that used by Peters & Zaidel (1980) and
Backscheider & Gelman (1995). In their procedure children were shown four
pictures, two of which were homonymous; the experimenter selected one,
and children had to find the other. This is prone to false positives, as
discussed above: if children realize they are not allowed to select the same
picture as the experimenter, they need only consider whether any of the other
three pictures is, e.g. a bat. To avoid this problem, children were shown a
single picture, and required to select a homonym from four additional
pictures, which comprised an identical picture, the target homonym, and two
distracters. Children had to avoid the identical picture, thus attending to the
meaning of the word, but pick something with the same name, thus also
attending to the form of the word. Therefore this task requires the ability to
understand the relationship between meaning and linguistic form
However, this modification renders the task prone to other false positives:
children could achieve a degree of success by selecting the object cor-
responding to the most common meaning of the word. This can be avoided
by making each of the two objects the target on separate trials, and requiring
successful choice on both trials. This makes the task analogous to the
Synonym Production task used by Doherty & Perner (1998, Experiments 3
& 4), but by doubling the number of trials, it makes the Homonym task
longer than the task used in Experiment 1. Because preschool children have
limited attention spans, and because the main comparison of interest in this
study is between understanding of homonymy and false belief, a Synonym
task was not included in Experiment 2. Instead, a second False Belief task
was included to give a more consistent picture of children’s false belief
understanding.
The homonym vocabulary phase was modified so that each sheet only
contained one homonym. Although the version used in Experiment 1 helped
alert children to the distinctions they had to make, it may also have produced
false negatives: being asked the same question twice, but having to select a
completely different object the second time is pragmatically rather odd, and
many children did initially seem to suspect they were being asked a trick
question. The object pointing control task was also modified to make it more
similar to the Homonym task. Now, just as in the Homonym task, children
had to avoid the identical picture, and pick a picture of a different object.
Instead of being a different kind of object with the same name, however, it
had to be a different object of the same kind (e.g. a different TV).
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Participants
The participants were 24 children (14 girls and 10 boys) from a state
preschool with a predominantly working class intake in Stirling, Scotland.
Ages ranged from 3 ;6 to 5 ;2, with a mean age of 4 ;2 and a standard deviation
of 6 months. For the analysis of results children were divided into two
groups: a younger group (12 children from 3 ;6 to 4 ;0, mean age 3 ;9, s.d.fl
2 months) and an older group (12 children from 4 ;0 to 5 ;2, mean age 4 ;7,
s.d.fl4–5 months).
Design
Each child was tested on all four tasks: Homonym Selection, Object
Selection control, ‘Sally’ False Belief, and ‘Puppet’ False Belief. Tasks were
administered over two sessions up to a week apart with two tasks per session.
The order of administration was counterbalanced in a 4‹4 sequence
balanced Latin square design. In addition the BPVS short form was
administered at the end of the session containing the Object Selection control
(because this was the shorter session).
procedure and materials
Homonym Selection task
The Homonym Selection task again comprised three phases: vocabulary
check, modelling, and test phase.
Vocabulary phase. Fourteen A4 sheets were used, each with a picture of one
of the seven homonyms to be used in the experiment, and 3 distracters. The
first sheet had a picture of a fish, a sofa, a cake, and a cricket bat. Children
were asked ‘which one is bat?’. If they chose incorrectly they were told the
right answer, then the next sheet was presented. The target on each of the
first seven sheets was one half of the seven homonym pairs. The other half
of each pair appeared in the same order on the last seven sheets.
Modelling and test phases. Children were shown an A4 sheet on which were
four pictures, both items from a homonym pair and two distracters. The first
sheet had a picture of a (metal) nail, a (finger) nail, a sofa, and a rabbit. Above
the A4 sheet was placed a 10‹15 cm card on which was a picture identical
to one of the homonym pictures on the sheet. For half the children it was a
finger nail, and for half a metal nail. The card was pointed out and the child
was told: ‘Look, here’s a nail. But, can you show me a different kind of
nail? ’.
If children pointed correctly they were praised and the experimenter
pointed to both pictures and said ‘yes, look, this is a nail and this is a nail,
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but they’re different aren’t they?’. If children pointed to the identical
picture, the experimenter pointed out that it was the same kind of nail, and
stressed they were looking for a different kind of nail. If the child still did not
point to the other half of the homonym pair, the experimenter indicated it
himself and then gave the feedback as for successful choice. This procedure
was repeated for the next two modelling items, bare}bear and knight}night.
For the test phase the procedure continued without feedback or prompting
for 2 sets of four new sheets and cards. Each experimental homonym pair
appeared once in each set, in the order: letter, bow, bat, glasses. Half of the
children received set A first, and half set B first. The cards presented with set
A}set B depicted:
Letter (grapheme}envelope)
Bow (ribbon}weapon)
Bat (flying}cricket)
Glasses (spectacles}drinking).
Object Selection control
The procedure in this task was designed to parallel the modelling and test
phases of the Homonym selection task. The only difference was that instead
of pictures of two items in a homonym pair, two pictures of different
exemplars of the same kind of thing were used. For example, the first sheet
had a TV (with four legs), another TV (on a pedestal, with an aerial on top),
a cat and a block of cheese. A picture of one of the TVs was placed above the
A4 sheet, pointed to, and the child was told:
‘Look, here’s a TV. But, can you show me a different kind of TV?’.
Feedback and explanations were given as for the Homonym Selection task.
The modelling phase was continued for two more trials with a sheet with
pictures of two different cups and a sheet with pictures of two different coats.
For the test phase the procedure continued without feedback or prompting
for 2 sets of four new sheets and cards. As for the Homonym task, each pair
appeared once in each set in the order: truck, tree, chair, house, and one
picture was on the cards in set A, and the other in set B. Half the children
received set A first, and half received set B first.
‘Sally ’ False Belief task
This was the same task used in Experiment 1.
‘Puppet ’ False Belief task
For this task children were introduced to Puppet, who was holding a key. He
put his key in a 9‹9 cm black box, and then went to have a nap in the
experimenter’s bag. While he was asleep the experimenter announced he was
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going to play a trick on Puppet, and moved the key from the box to
underneath the experimenter’s scoring sheets. Then Puppet ‘woke up’, and
as the experimenter reached into his bag to retrieve him, the child was asked
the following questions:
Belief question: Where will Puppet look first for his key?
Reality question: Where is the key really?
Memory question: Where did Puppet put the key in the beginning?
results
Vocabulary check
Vocabulary performance was good: 14 children identified all four ex-
perimental pairs and the remaining 10 children identified three of the four
experimental pairs. Eight out of the ten failures were on bow}bow, 1 was on
(flying) bat and 1 was on letter (envelope). Immediately following a
vocabulary failure the correct object was pointed out to children. In the
Homonym Selection task, 6 of the 10 children failing a pair on the vocabulary
check went on to pass that pair and the remaining 4 children failed all 4 pairs,
despite identifying 3 of them all in the vocabulary test. Therefore lack of
vocabulary cannot explain poor performance on the Homonym Selection
task.
Homonym Selection task and Object Selection control task
Figure 2 shows the number of children selecting 0 to 4 homonym pairs.
Children selected a mean of 2–67 pairs out of 4 (67%) on the Homonym
Selection task, and 3–13 pairs out of 4 (78%) on the Object Selection control
task. Performance on both tasks improved with age: for the Homonym task,
the younger group selected 50% and the older group selected 83% of
homonym pairs; for the Object Selection task, the younger group selected
65% and the older group selected 92% of object pairs. Performance of both
age groups on both tasks was significantly above the level expected by chance
(one sample t-tests, dffl11, p!0–01 in each case). An analysis of variance
was carried out over the number of pairs selected for the Homonym and
Object Selection tasks, with the two age groups as a between subjects factor
and tasks as a within subjects factor. Age group was significant (F(1, 22)fl
6–38, pfl0–019) but condition was not (F(1, 22)fl1–74, pfl0–20) and there
was no interaction (F(1, 22)fl0–13, pfl0–722). (Using a MANOVA with
tasks as dependent variables produces precisely the same result, since there
are only two tasks.)
Despite the lack of significant difference between overall level of per-
formance on the two tasks, the pattern of responses was quite different. For
the Homonym Selection task, 21 out of 24 children selected either all four
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Fig. 2. Number of children selecting 0–4 homonym pairs and showing false belief
understanding in Experiment 2.
pairs or none (see Figure 2). This suggests that children’s difficulties with
this task are conceptual. For the Object Selection control task, however, 20
out of 24 children selected 3 or 4 pairs, and the 8 children who selected 3 pairs
only failed one of the 8 trials. Nevertheless, performance on the control task
will be partialled out from the later analysis relating performance on the false
belief and Homonym Selection tasks.
False Belief tasks
Thirteen children passed the ‘Sally’ False Belief task (54%) and 16 children
passed the ‘Puppet’ False Belief task (67%). Although the ‘Puppet’ task
seems to have been slightly easier, this was not significant (Binomial, nfl5,
kfl1, pfl0–376). Each task shows non-significant improvement with age:
‘Sally’ task, younger children 42% correct, older children 67% correct,
Fisher’s exact, pfl0–2068 ; ‘Puppet’ task, younger children 58% correct,
older children 75% correct, Fisher’s exact, pfl0–33. The youngest child
failed the ‘Puppet’ memory control question, and failed all other tasks. No
child failed the ‘Sally’ memory control question. Since the two tasks were
highly correlated (rfl0–59, pfl0–002) and did not differ significantly, for
comparison with the Homonym Selection task they were combined to give a
False Belief score from 0 (fail both) to 2 (pass both).
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Comparison of tasks
Figure 2 also compares performance on the False Belief tasks with the
number of homonym pairs selected. Table 5 gives further details of the
table 5 . (a) Ranges, means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations
between variables of Experiment . (b) Correlations between Homonym,
Synonym, and False Belief tasks, partialling out verbal mental age (BPVS)
and age
(a)
Variable Range Mean s.d.
Age 3 ;6–5 ;2 4 ;2 6 m.
BPVS 2 ;2–7 ;3 4 ;9 18 m.
Homonym 0–4 2–67 1–81
Object Selection 0–4 3–13 1–23
False Belief :
‘Sally ’ 0–1 0–54 0–51
‘Puppet’ 0–1 0–67 0–48
Combined 0–2 1–21 0–88
Object
Selection
False
Belief BPVS AGE
Homonym 0–45* 0–73*** 0–33 0–46*
Object Selection — 0–46* 0–37 0–43*
False Belief — 0–21 0–39*
BPVS — 0–24
(b)
Synonym
False
Belief
Homonym 0–26 0–66***
Object Selection — 0–33
*p!0–05 ; **p!0–01 ; ***p!0–001.
experimental variables, and the correlations between them. Clearly per-
formance on the Homonym and False Belief tasks is strongly related, rfl
0–73, dffl22, p!0–0001. As shown in Table 5(b), it remains substantially
and significantly related even after performance on the BPVS and Age have
been partialled out. This is also the case if performance on the Object
Selection control task is partialled out in addition to age and BPVS score,
rfl0–63, dffl19, p!0–01.
The levels of children’s performance on the two tasks are very similar:
children were 61% successful on the False Belief task, and 67% successful
on the Homonym Selection task. Because they are on different scales the two
tasks cannot be compared directly, but if scores of 2 or above on the
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Homonym task and 1 or 2 on the False Belief task are counted as success, the
two tasks do not differ in difficulty: Binomial, nfl4, kfl2, pfl0–688.
In Experiment 1, performances on the Homonym and False Belief tasks
were only associated for the older children, the children who performed well
on the False Belief task. In the present experiment, however, the association
was equally strong for each age group. For the older children the correlation
between the Homonym and False Belief tasks was rfl0–74, dffl10, p!0–01.
When BPVS score and age were partialled out, the correlation remained
significant, rfl0–70, dffl8, p!0–05. For the younger children, the cor-
relation between the two tasks was rfl0–69, dffl10, p!0–05. When BPVS
score and age were partialled out, the correlation again remained significant,
rfl0–68, dffl8, p!0–05. This comparison is meaningful since, although
children in Experiment 2 were older than children in Experiment 1, the age
groups are roughly matched in terms of performance on the ‘Sally’ False
Belief task: the younger groups were 33 and 42% correct in Experiments
1 and 2, respectively, and the older groups were 75 and 67% correct
respectively." Thus, with the improved methodology of Experiment 2, even
for groups which perform poorly on the False Belief task, the Homonym and
False Belief tasks are associated.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 confirm those of Experiment 1 : there is rapid
improvement in children’s ability to understand homonymy around the age
of four years. Again, the failure of younger children cannot be attributed to
lack of vocabulary. Furthermore, the possibility of false positives inherent in
Experiment 1 and previous studies was removed. The improved methodology
of Experiment 2 requires children to coordinate sameness of linguistic form
with difference in meaning. In doing so, children must represent the
relationship between linguistic form and what it represents. This ability is
central to definitions of metalinguistic awareness, discussed below.
In Experiment 1, the younger children performed poorly on the False
Belief task, but less poorly on the Homonym task, and for the younger group
the two tasks no longer correlated significantly when age and BPVS scores
were partialled out. This raised two possibilities : (1) that younger children
had some understanding of homonymy prior to understanding false belief ;
(2) that there was a source of false positives on the Homonym task inflating
performance especially amongst younger children and weakening the as-
[1] It is common for there to be variations in the age at which children pass the false belief
task, depending on where the sample was drawn from. For example, in the very first false
belief study, Wimmer & Perner (1983) found only 50% of five-year-olds were successful.
In the present study, variations in ability were probably a result of the children in
Experiment 1 being predominantly middle class, and the children in Experiment 2 being
predominantly working class.
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sociation with the False Belief task. When this possibility of false positives
was removed in Experiment 2, performances on the Homonym and False
Belief tasks were more comparable and associated more strongly, even in the
younger group (roughly matched in terms of false belief performance with
the younger group of Experiment 1). This suggests that the ability to
understand homonymy is not present prior to the ability to understand false
belief.
The less than perfect performance on the Object Selection control task is
slightly surprising. However, although performance was not significantly
better than on the Homonym task, the patterns of performance were quite
different. Since most children passed all trials or only failed one, the
problems with this task seem to result from occasional lapses in attention.
Thus this task served its purpose as a control – since almost all the children
could clearly understand the task demands and make the necessary dis-
criminations, these difficulties cannot account for failure on the Homonym
task. Furthermore, the association between the control task and the Hom-
onym task was very low, and did not persist beyond a common association
with chronological and verbal mental age.
general discussion
The main findings of this study are as follows:
(1) The ability to select homonyms, or judge others’ selection of
homonyms, arises around the age of four years. This accords well with the
findings of Peters & Zaidel (1980) and Backscheider & Gelman (1995). This
study extends previous research by showing that lack of the necessary
vocabulary is not the cause of children’s selection difficulties. The addition
of analogous control conditions also shows that children’s problems were not
to do with the process of selection – for example, poor search skills or more
general difficulties with the format or understanding of the task demands.
The methodology developed in Experiment 2 also precludes a possible
source of false positives inherent in the design of Experiment 1 and previous
studies.
It should be borne in mind, however, that the experimental design
provides children with extensive assistance. They are primed with both
referents of homonyms in the vocabulary checks, and they are simultaneously
shown both exemplars in the test phase. In everyday life, without such aids,
identifying homonyms may be more difficult.
(2) The ability to select homonyms does not arise in isolation. It is
strongly related to the ability to select synonyms, and more surprisingly to
the ability to pass the false belief task. These relationships persist beyond a
common association with chronological and verbal mental age.
The results help discriminate the possible accounts of children’s difficulty
with homonymy. Three general accounts were outlined: the metalinguistic
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deficit account, in which younger children lack the conceptual understanding
necessary to understand homonymy; the metalinguistic one-to-one mapping
account, in which children possess the conceptual understanding but make
an erroneous assumption about the relationship between words and their
referents; the implicit one-to-one mapping account, in which children
simply fail to learn homonyms.
The implicit one-to-one mapping account cannot account for the results of
the study. Because the experimental homonyms were demonstrably in
children’s vocabularies, poor performance cannot be a result of a tendency
not to learn homonyms. It may nevertheless be true that children (and even
adults) are biased not to learn homonyms, but once they have learned them
the younger children have some additional source of difficulty.
The other two accounts are harder to distinguish between, since both can
account for the relationship between understanding of homonymy and false
belief. The metalinguistic deficit account predicted this association based on
Doherty & Perner’s (1998) hypothesis that each of these tasks requires a
distinction between what is represented and how it is represented (Perner,
1991, 1995). According to this hypothesis, younger children fail both tasks
because they are unable to make this distinction. However, this association
could potentially also be explained by the metalinguistic one-to-one mapping
account. For example, Flavell (1988) suggested that theory of mind tasks and
mutual exclusivity tasks both call for the understanding that objects can be
represented in more than one way. Prior to this children could assume a one-
to-one correspondence between words and their referents, and between
thoughts and the world. This assumption could account for the association
between performance on the false belief task and the homonym task.
If children really did think that one thing could be represented in only one
way, they would be expected to have difficulty with the vocabulary checks.
However, in the synonym vocabulary check, all children were willing on the
same occasion to point to an item when identified under one and then the
other synonym; in the homonym vocabulary check of Experiment 1, children
were willing to point to different objects identified under the same name. Had
children been using a one-to-one mapping assumption, they might be
expected to reject one label in the synonym vocabulary check, and reject one
of the referents in the homonym vocabulary check.
However, it is also possible to argue that during the vocabulary checks
children with a one-to-one mapping assumption were put in a position where
they had no choice other than to accept violations of that assumption. During
the test phase they were free to reassert this assumption and consequently
selected or judged incorrectly. The vocabulary data are therefore not
conclusive.
The one-to-one mapping assumption should also have lead to characteristic
error patterns in the test phases of the Homonym and Synonym Judgement
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tasks. In the Homonym Judgement task, assuming that the homonym only
applies to one of the objects would lead children to endorse Puppet’s choice
of the object they themselves indicated and to reject Puppet’s choice of the
homonym or an unrelated item. Only one child showed this pattern.
Similarly for the Synonym task, children would be expected to endorse
Puppet’s repetition of the term they themselves had provided and reject
Puppet’s use of a synonym or a misnomer. Only three children showed this
pattern. In the Homonym Selection task, a one-to-one mapping assumption
would lead children to select the ‘correct’ homonym regardless of the picture
on the card. Thus children failing the task would correctly select 4 single
homonyms but no pairs. However, of the 7 children who selected no pairs,
3 selected no single homonyms, 3 selected only 1, and 1 child selected 3 single
homonyms.
Given the small number of children failing the homonym tasks in both
experiments, however, it would be unwise to make strong conclusions based
on this error data. Although the present study suggests that children do not
employ an explicit one-to-one mapping assumption, more data are needed to
convincingly distinguish between the metalinguistic deficit and meta-
linguistic one-to-one mapping accounts. Direct comparison of them using
homonyms is difficult, since the two theories make very similar predictions.
If children are confronted with homonymy in an experimental situation, it is
always possible to argue that they have a one-to-one bias but relax it (if only
temporarily) given strong evidence that it is inappropriate in any given
setting.
A more promising way of distinguishing them is to look for parallel
developments of other metalinguistic abilities. The distinction between what
is represented and how it is represented is characteristic of many abilities
considered metalinguistic. One example is grammatical awareness, which
requires children to understand the link between grammatical form and
meaning. Data suggest that children begin to succeed on tests of grammatical
awareness around the age of four years; for example, Smith & Tager-
Flusberg (1982) found that whilst 78% of four-year-olds successfully judged
the grammaticality of short sentences, only 22% of three-year-olds could do
so.
If this ability were found to relate to children’s understanding of false
belief, or their understanding of homonymy and synonymy, it would provide
further evidence for the development of metalinguistic awareness around the
age of four years. According to the one-to-one mapping account, however,
younger children have metalinguistic awareness coupled with assumptions
about the exclusivity of the relationship between meaning and linguistic
form. Children ought to be able to recognize ungrammatical sentences, since,
apart from anything else, they violate the normal relationship between (for
example) word order and meaning. Unfortunately, as many authors have
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pointed out (e.g. Bowey, 1988 ; Gombert, 1992), successful judgements of
grammaticality could be based on semantic rather than syntactic judgements:
ungrammatical sentences are harder to understand. This confounding factor
would have to be removed before one could be sure that children were
making a metalinguistic judgement.
Regardless of whether children employ a metalinguistic one-to-one map-
ping account or not, their word learning may still conform to one-to-one
mapping or mutual exclusivity biases. Even adults, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, are likely to employ such biases when learning novel words
However, clearly words, such as homonyms and synonyms, that violate these
assumptions are learned, so these biases do not preclude the learning of
words that violate the one-to-one mapping assumption.
conclusion
The results of the present study show that despite possessing the necessary
vocabulary, until the age of roughly four years children are unable to identify
both items from a homonym pair. More importantly, the ability to under-
stand homonymy develops at the same time, and is closely associated with the
ability to understand false belief. This extends and replicates Doherty &
Perner’s (1998) finding that the ability to understand synonymy is closely
associated with the ability to understand false belief. The results suggest that
prior to this age children do not possess the metalinguistic awareness
necessary to represent the relationship between words and their referents,
which is needed to understand homonymy. However, it is also possible that
children have the necessary metalinguistic awareness but make a simplifying
assumption that words and their referents bear a one-to-one relationship, and
so discount the possibility of homonymy. More general research on the
development of metalinguistic awareness should help to further distinguish
these two accounts.
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